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The Winning National
Moot Court Brief
Editor's Note: The Nebraska Law Review is proud to reproduce here the winning brief of the Seventh Annual National Moot
Court Competition submitted by a three-member team representing the University of Nebraska College of Law. To retain that value
which may be gained from the brief as a style guide for other collegiafe teams in moot court competitions and for the practicing
lawyer, the brief is published as it appeared in the final round
of competition, rather than in the newly-adopted format and typographical style of the Nebraska Law Review. More important,
the substance of the brief deals with a perplexing problem of the
criminal law-the defense of insanity. The brief is of course a
document advocating one side of the issue. The following brief
summary of the legal issue raised is included to place the brief
in its proper context.
The classic Anglo-American teaching on the test for insanity
as a defense in a criminal case has for generations been embodied
in McNaughtem's Case,' decided by the House of Lords in 1843.
McNaughten lays it down that a defendant may only be acquitted
for insanity where "at the time of the committing of the act, [he]
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or... that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."'2 Few
judicial pronouncements have found such general acceptance into
our law. The McNaughten or "right and wrong" formula is today
the exclusive basis for determining criminal insanity both in England and Canada and in approximately thirty American jurisdictions. A sizeable minority of the states, however, have held that
the "right and wrong" test is not adequate for all cases but that a
crime may also be excused for insanity where defendant's mental
faculties were so impaired by disease that he lacked the power
of conscious volition and inhibition and so was unable to resist
an impulse to commit the act. This is the so-called "irresistible
impulse" supplement to McNaughten. But the breadth of the supplement is not great, even theoretically. The McNaughten formula,

'10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
at 210.

2 Id.,
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in other words, remains as the basic test for criminal insanity even
in "irresistible impulse" jurisdictions.
This overwhelming judicial adherence to McNaughten is particularly striking on account of the many and bitter attacks levelled
against the formula, both with and without its gloss. The considerations put forth as requiring its burial will not be reviewed here.
Suffice it to say that until 1954 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
was the only tribunal willing to give them credence in the form of
a decision, and this as long ago as 1869. 3 New Hampshire's rule
since 1869 has simply been that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the offspring of mental disease or
mental defect. But New Hampshire stood alone for 85 years, until
joined by the District of Columbia as a result of the Court of
Appeals' decision in Durham v. United States4 which has since become one of the most widely discussed and controversial cases of
our time. Durham expressly adopts the New Hampshire rule, finding
that McNaughten-even when extended by the doctrine of "irresistible impulse," as had previously been don&-falls considerably short of the mark. Ironically, this was the same Court which,
only nine years previously, had found no error in the trial court's
refusal to instruct that defendant's mental disorder (short of criminal insanity) should be considered as showing a possible lack of
the deliberation and premeditation necessary to constitute first
degree murder. 6
Unquestionably, Durham is the most significant development
in the law of criminal insanity since McNaughten. This is not,
however, merely because of its break with the past, except only
indirectly, or even in the added importance it gives to the role of
the psychiatrist and of the lawyer who seeks to manipulate and
persuade him. The psychiatrist, after all, is the only one qualified
to give content to the concept of mental disease influencing action.
The mere change of wording in the instruction to the jury will
probably mean little; that Monte Durham's retrial under the new

3 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399- (1869). See also, State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369
(1871).
4 214 F.2d 862 (App. D.C., 1954).
5 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (App. D.C., 1929).
6Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28 (App. D.C., 1945), aff'd on other
grounds, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). Compare Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d
879, 883 (App. D.C., 1954). Fisher has uniformly been condemned in the
law reviews. See, e.g., W~ihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting
the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L.J. 959 (1947).

COMMENTS
test resulted in a conviction should surprise no one. 7 The principal
significance of the case seems rather to lie in the intense interest
it has engendered in the problem of the marginally insane criminal
and in the problem of criminal responsibility in general. The law
journals published since Durham have contained more searching
discussion of such problems than ever before. Attention has likewise
heavily been directed upon the treatment afforded those acquitted
by reason of insanity. For example, the question whether or
not conviction and prison may not sometimes be preferable to such
treatment has squarely been raised. 8
The brief which follows is also part of the discussion kindled
by Durham. The hypothetical case prepared by the National Moot
Court authorities vas obviously drafted in the light of Monte Durham and for the purpose of casting more light on whether such
a man should be punished as a criminal or be sent to a mental
hospital. The brief is indeed excellent, an eloquent plea for
the latter course. Not everyone, to be sure, will agree with the conclusions reached. That is unimportant though it would be otherwise if everyone did. The point is that the brief is an example of
student work at its best on problems vitally affecting the administration of the criminal law.

7 See Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d 760 (App. D.C., 1956). The
conviction was again reversed, however, because of trial court error in
telling the jury that Durham had been found competent to stand trial and
for conveying the impression that he would soon be released as cured from
the mental hospital if he was found not guilty. On the eve of the scheduled
third trial Durham pleaded guilty, thereby admitting that he was not
legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense. See United
States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D.D.C. 1957).
8
E.g., De Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.

339 (1955).

490

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

COMMENTS

Oupreme Court of the Sniteb Otato
OCTOBER TERM,

1956.

No. 13.

CARL YOUNG,
Petitioner,
V).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER.

PATRICK W. HEALEY,
JAMES M. KNAPP,
JERROLD L. STRASHEIM,

Attorneys for Petitioner,
UNIVERSITY op NEBRASKA CoLLEGE oi LAw,

Lincoln, Nebraska.

Printed in the interest of the National Competition by
PANDICK PRESS, INC.
22 THAMEs STREET,

New York 6, N. Y.

492

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

COMMENTS

INDEX.
PAGE

OPrm ox Bmzow ..................................................................

497

QuEsTioNs PESENTED -------------------------------------497
STATEMENT

--------------------------------------------498

SUMMARY OF

AWuMT -------------------------------.-..............

.

499

AR-GUMENT --------------------------------------------501

I.--It was error to refuse to instruct the
jury that the petitioner may not be convicted for
an act which was the product of mental disease
501
A. The right and wrong test abstracts a single
possible symptom of mental disorder, which
has no essential relation to the degree of
mental disturbance, and makes that symptom conclusive of responsibility ...................
502
B. The inadequacies of the right and wrong
test as a norm for criminal responsibility
are not remedied by the doctrine of irresistible impulse -----------------------------------508
C. The product of mental disease test remedies
the basic defects of the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse rules and provides an
effective norm of criminal responsibility-....
512

POINT

POINT I.-It was error to refuse to instruct the

jury that the petitioner's mental condition
might be considered in determining whether the
homicide had been committed with the premeditation and deliberation necessary to constitute
first degree murder ------------------------------------516
A. To sustain a conviction for first degree
murder premeditation and deliberation may
not be implied but must be established in
fact ---------------------------. .................................

518

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

i
PAGE

B. Evidence that the accused was mentally
disordered is relevant in determining
whether the accused in fact premeditated
and deliberated ------------------------------------518
0. Implicit in the legislative division of murder
into degrees is a policy to apply the death
penalty only to that class of murderers
likely to be influenced by its threat. Rejection of partial responsibility is inconsistent
with this aim .-------------------------------------522
D. The refusal of the requested instruction on
partial responsibility prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioner -----------------524
CONOLUSI01N

......................................

....... I5...................2

526

COMMENTS

CITATION~S.

CASES.
PAGE

Anderson v. Grasberg,78 N. W. 2d 450 (Minn. 1956)
Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N. E. 123 (1889) ....
Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492 (1869) --------------------------Bullock v. U. S., 122 F. 2d 213 (D. C. Cir. 1951) ---------

515
518
509
522

Durhamv. U. S., 214 F. 2d 862 (C. A. D. C. 1954)...
506,
512, 513, 514, 515
Fisherv. U. S., 328 U. S. 463 (1946).. 506, 519, 521, 523, 525
Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282 (1800) ----------Hemptom v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596 (1901)
Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631 (1881) -----------------------Kotteakos v. U. S., 328 U. S. 750 (1946) -----------------

512
521
519
524

Kwaku Minsah v. Rex (1946) A. C. 83 ---------------------

525

McElroyv. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S. W. 883 (1922)

512

Opinion of the Judges in M'Naghten's Case, 10
Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843) ......

502

Parsonsv. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1886) ----------People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124 (1907) ...

509
511

Rex v. True, 16 Crim. App. Rep. 164 (1922) ---------------

510

Sabens v. U. S., 40 App. D. C. 440 (1913) ----------------State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 (1915)
State v. Harrison,36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892)
State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871) ------------------------ 504,
State v. Voel, 102 N. J. L. 659, 133 Atl. 274 (1926)
State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870) -----------------------------State v. Thompson, Wright's Ohio Rep. 617 (1834)

518
525
510
508
521
512
508

U. S. ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (3d Cir
505, 515
1951) ---------------------------------------------U. S. v. Kunak, 5 U. S. C. M. A. 346, 17 C. M. R. 346
(1954) --------------------------------------------519, 525

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

iv
UNITED STATES STATUTES.
PAGE

62 Stat. 741 (1948), 18 U. S. C. Sec. 875(c) (1952)

498

35 Stat. 1143 (1909), 18 U. S. C. Sec. 1111 (1952) 499, 516

48 Stat. 780 (1934), as amended, 18 U. S. C. Sec.
499
1114 (1952) ---------------------------------------------------M]sELLAREOus.

Abrahamsen, Report to American Psychopathological Ass'n, 1953 ......................................................

510

Biggs, The Guilty Mind 139-142 (1955) --------------------

506

Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law
418 (1952) ----------------------------------------------------504, 514
Hall, In Defense of the M'Naghten Rules, 42 American Bar Ass'n. J. 917 (1956) --------------------------------------

510

Kinburg, Forensic Psychiatry Without Metaphysics , 40 J. Crim. Law and Criminology 555 (1950)

512

Ray, Mkedical Jurisprudence 49 (5th Ed. 1871) ---------505

Report No. 26 of Committee on Psychiatry and Law
of the Group for Advancement of Psychiatry 7-8
(1954) -----------------------------------------------------515
Report of English Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment 80 (1949-1953) --------------------------- 503, 514, 515

Report of Law Revision Commission of New York
for 1937 574 --------------------------------------------------523

COMMENTS

*upreme Coaut of the mniteb &tatzz
OCTOBER TERm,

1956.

No. 13.

CARL YOUNG,

Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AmEmcA,

Respondent.
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BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER.
Opinion Below.
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Thirteenth Circuit (R. 9-15) has not been officially
reported.
Questions Presented.
1. Whether it was error to refuse to instruct the jury
that the petitioner may not be convicted for an act which
was the product of mental disease.
2. Whether it was error to refuse to instruct the jury
that evidence of mental unsoundness may be considered in
determining whether the petitioner was capable of the
deliberation and premeditation necessary for a conviction
of murder in the first degree.
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Statement.
For many years the petitioner, Carl Young, suffered
from severe mental disturbance. In 1945 he received a
medical discharge from the service, based on psychiatric
examination revealing a "profound personality disorder
which rendered him unfit for military service" (R. 11). In
1953 after an arrest for assault and battery, he was committed by court order for psychiatric examination. His
condition was diagnosed as "psychosis with psychopathic
personality" (R. 11). Released after treatment for twelve
months, he was still subject to violent rages and moods of
deep despondency (R. 11). In December of 1955 his wife
took their two children from their home and went to live
with her family in another state (R. 9). During January,
both by letter and by phone, he frequently requested her
to return the children. She rejected these demands (R.
9-10). He phoned again on February 3 and February 5,
demanding custody of the children; when she refused he
threatened her life (R. 10). She reported the threats to
the local United States Attorney, who filed a complaint
charging violation of 18 U. S. C., Sec. 875 (c) (threat of
bodily harm by interstate communication), and a warrant
was issued for Young's arrest (R. 10).
Two F. B. I. agents, Richard Fosdick and Michael
Hammer, were assigned to locate and arrest him. Finding
him at home, they told him that he was under arrest (R. 10).
During questioning concerning difficulties with his wife and
the threatening phone calls, Young was cooperative. However when the questioning turned to the children, he became
visibly agitated. Agent Hammer asked, "Do you think
you'll get your children back by threatening your wife?"
(R. 10). The question had a trigger-like effect on Young.
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He leaped- at Fosdick and snatched the agent's pistol from
the holster, which was exposed since Fosdick had removed
his coat (R. 10-11). Pointing the gun at Fosdick, Young
said, "I'm going to get my kids. Don't try and stop me."
Told to put the gun down, Young told Fosdick, "If you
move, I'll kill you." Fosdick stepped forward, and was
mortally wounded by two shots from the pistol (R. 11).
Brought to trial for the first degree murder of a government agent engaged in official duties (18 U. S. C. Sees. 1111,
1114) (R. 9), Young's defense was that his mental condition was such as to relieve him of criminal responsibility,
or at least to render him incapable of the premeditation
and deliberation which are elements of first degree murder.
Accordingly, the trial court was requested to instruct the
jury, (1) that if the accused's act was the product of his
mental disease, he is not criminally responsible (R. 13);
and (2) that the jury might consider evidence of mental
disturbance, even though not amounting to insanity, on the
issue of whether premeditation and deliberation existed,
so as to constitute first degree murder (R. 14-15). Both
requests were denied (R. 13-15) and the denials properly
excepted to (R. 5).
Young was found guilty of first degree murder and
sentenced to death (R. 1). The Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth Circuit affirmed (R. 16).
Summary of Argument.
Petitioner's first contention is that he is not guilty of
the crime for which he was convicted for the reason that
at the time of the killing of the Federal agent, as for a
long time previously, he had been suffering from severe
mental disorder, and his act was the product of that dis-
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order. Petitioner was, however, precluded from effectively
utilizing this defense at the trial because the District Court
instructed the jury that petitioner was punishable if at
the time of the act he knew "right from wrong," knew
the "nature dnd quality" of what he was doing, and was
not impelled by "irresistible impulse." The Court refused
a request of petitioner's counsel to instruct that punishment could not be imposed for an act which was the product
of mental disease.
The charge the Court gave was erroneous, since the
particular factors the trial court selected as determinative
of responsibility are merely possible symptoms of mental
disease, which "do not necessarily, or even typically, accompany even the most serious mental disorder" Durham v.
United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 876 (D. C. Cir. 1954). Since
these symptoms have no essential relation to the extent
of mental disturbance, the result of punishing one who lacks
such symptoms but is nevertheless grossly insane is to
punish the victim of disease for his affliction.
Petitioner further contends that even if he is to be
held "legally sane," and hence responsible for the killing,
his conviction of first degree murder cannot stand. Evidence that the petitioner was suffering from mental disorder which rendered him incapable of a deliberate and
premeditated killing was introduced at the trial. Such
evidence is relevant, for one who was incapable of premeditating and deliberating necessarily did not do so. The
trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury specifically that they might consider accused's mental disorder
in determining the degree of crime committed. A specific
instruction to this effect is necessary, for otherwise the
jury is likely to confuse the defense that the murder was
not in the first degree with the defehse that the accused
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was not responsible for any crime, and not attach any
significance to evidence of mental disorder in respect to
the former defense.
The refusal of the District Court to instruct the jury
as requested by the petitioner prejudiced his substantial
rights, and the conviction must accordingly be set aside.

ARGUMENT.
POINT

I.

It was error to refuse to instruct the jury that the
petitioner may not be convicted for an act which was
the product of mental disease.
The question in this case is whether the petitioner, Carl
Young, should be executed as a criminal or committed and
treated as an insane person. There is no doubt that his
act caused the death of a Federal agent; or that at the
time of that act he knew right from wrong, knew the
"nature and quality" of what he was doing, and was not
impelled by irresistible impulse. The jury so found. But
these factors alone, petitioner maintains, are not sufficient
to make his act criminal.
Petitioner's defense at the trial was that at the time
of the killing he was insane, and that his act was the offspring of his mental disease and hence not criminally
punishable. In accordance with that theory, the petitioner
requested an instruction that he would not be responsible
if he was "suffering from mental disease and.., this act
was the product of his mental condition" (R. 13). The
court refused this instruction, and instead charged that the
petitioner was sane and punishable unless he "was laboring
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under a defect of reason from disease of the mind such
that he did not know the nature and quality of his act or
did not know the difference between right and wrong so
as to know that his act was wrong" (R. 13), or "was suffering from a diseased condition of the mind which so far
destroyed his will, The governing parts of his mind, that
his actions were not subject to the will, but beyond its
control" (R. 14).
The instructions given by the trial court, rendering
petitioner's theory of defense completely meaningless,
were errors requiring reversal of his conviction.
A. The right and wrong test abstracts a single possible
symptom of mental disorder, which has no essential relation
to the degree of mental disturbance, and makes that
symptom conclusive of responsibility.

The first portion of the court's instruction on the defense
of insanity, referring to knowledge of the "nature and
quality" of the act and knowledge that it is wrong, is
derived from the 1843 Opinion of the Judges in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L.
1843). That test states that the accused, in all cases, is to
be pronounced responsible if he was aware at the time of
the act of its nature and quality, and that it was wrong,
regardless of the extent of his mental disturbance in other
respects. Petitioner contends that this test is obsolete in
the light of modern medical knowledge, and is inadequate
as a norm of criminal responsibility.
If insanity at the time of the act is to be accepted as a
ground for excusing the madman from criminal responsibility, it is necessary to formulate a test describing the
circumstances in which madness will furnish a defense.
A test with this function should have some relation to the
degree to which the mind of the accused is impaired by
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disease. Science has made it clear that lack of cognitive
awareness of right and wrong, and of the "nature and
quality" of the act, are only possible symptoms of mental
disease, and are not even typically associated with some
of the more severe forms of mental disorder. Therefore,
lack of such knowledge is an inadequate test of responsibility.
The absence of relation between the degree of mental
disturbance and the symptoms selected as determinative
by the M'Naghten rules has been pointed out by the English
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-53. After
an exhaustive survey of all aspects of the question, that
body concluded that the right-wrong test was:
"1... based on an entirely obsolete and misleading

conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity
does not only, or primarily, affect the cognitive or
intellectual faculties, but affects the whole personality of the patient, including both the will and the
emotions. An insane person may therefore often
know the nature and quality of his act and that it is
wrong and forbidden by law, and yet commit it as
the result of the mental disease." Royal Commission
Report 80.
Lack of knowledge of right and wrong is, in fact, so little
indicative of serious mental disease that most inhabitants
of an insane asylum possess such knowledge. Dr. Isaac
Ray, the foremost American forensic psychiatrist of his
day, is quoted by the New Hampshire Court as follows:
"To persons practically acquainted with the insane
mind, it is well known that in every hospital for
the insane are patients capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong, knowing well enough how
to appreciate the nature and legal consequences of
their acts, acknowledging the sanctions of religion,
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and never acting from irresistible impulse, but
deliberately and shrewdly." State v. Jones, 50 N. H.
369, 395 (1871).
How does it happen that a test with the function of stating when insanity will excuse the actor has so little relation
to whether or not he is insane, and if so, to the extent of
his insanity? The answer lies in the fact that the rightwrong test was conceived in a period of ignorance of the
real nature of mental disorder, and based on erroneous
notions as to the functioning of the human mind. Underlying its formulation was an assumption, based on medical
views then accepted, that the human mind is composed of
distinct faculties, each performing its function independently of the others. Recurring again and again throughout
the MI'Naghten opinion is a limitation of the rule to those
"who labor under such partial delusions only, and are not
in other respects insane." The assumption that such a
mental state exists is based on medical misconceptions of
the day, and is completely unreal in the light of modern
knowledge. The indebtedness to now exploded medical
theories is described in Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry-andthe Law 418 (1952):
'-'The judge's assumption that a person might
suffer from delusions and yet be otherwise unaffected
mentally was based on medical misconceptions of the
time, the now exploded theories of monomania and
phrenology. Monomania was ...

essentially a state

of mind characterized by the predominance of one
insane idea, while the rest of the mind was normal."
Modern psychiatric knowledge makes it plain that the
human mind and personality is an integrated whole, and
that no "faculty" of the mind can operate independently
of the remainder of the self. .A delusion is not an isolated
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fragment of mental life, unrelated to other aspects of the
personality. It is, rather, the form in which' underlying
mental disorder manifests itself; the shape in which underlying conflicts and aggressions masquerade in particular
instances of mental disorder.
The judiciary has not remained unaware of the unreal
nature of the assumption of compartmentalized faculties
underlying the M'Naghten rules. Speaking for three dissenting judges of the 3rd Circuit, sitting en baiz in Uvited
States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 567 (3rd Cir.
1951), Judge Biggs pointed out, in advocating a test similar
to that proposed by petitioner in this case:
"M'Naghten's Case... assumes the existence of a
logic-tight compartment in which the delusion holds
sway leaving the balance of the mind intact ... the

criminal retains enough logic in the tight compartment so that from this sanctuary of reason he may
inform himself as to what the other part of his mind,
the insane part, has compelled or permitted his
body to do. If the sane portion of the accused's mind
knows that what the insane part compels or permits
his body to do is wrong, the body must suffer for it
by way of electrocution or hanging, obliterating
both the good and the bad portions, as well as the
residence of both."
Armed, then, with such a conception of a mind fully
reasonable surrounding a single self-contained insane delusion, the judges in M'Naghten's Case could well tell the
lunatic that he must, at his peril, apply rationally the
knowledge of right which the "sane portion" of his mind
perceives. As Dr. Isaac Ray succinctly stated, the right
and wrong test is very reasonable, "if insane men would
but listen to reason." Ray, Medical Jurispriidence49 (5th
Ed. 1871).
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Since the right-wrong test makes relevant only certain
possible symptoms which constitute only a small aspect
of mental disease, the jury is never informed accurately
whether the accused is in fact insane, or if so, of the
nature of the disorder with which he is afflicted. The
psychiatrist, from whom a great deal of information on
this question could be learned, is unduly restricted in his
testimony. Once the expert witness has been probed
r~garding the questions-meaningless to him--of right and
wrong, any attempt at amplification or explanation is
likely to be choked off, either as irrelevant, or because the
question has already been answered. Examples of this
restraint upon communication of the psychiatrist's knowledge of the accused's mental condition appear in a number of cases. At the trial in Durham v. United States, 214
F. 2d 862, 868 (D. C. Cir. 1954):
".. . when defense counsel sought elaboration
from Dr. Gilbert on his answers relating to the 'right
and wrong' test, the court cut short the questioning
with the admonition that 'you have answered the
question, Doctor.' "
Another flagrant example of the frustration of psychiatric testimony appears in the transcript of the trial
in Fisherv. United States, appealed to this court on another
question in 328 U. S. 463 (1946). Quoted in Biggs, The
Guilty Mind 139-142 (1955), the transcript reads in part:
Q. Is it your opinion, then, that this defendant
Fisher could not distinguish between the right and
wrong of the act which he did? A. In part, yes.
As I told you before, I don't think you can answer
these questions categorically, "yes" or "no" to a
question, unless you want further amplification. But
to answer "yes" or "no" to your question, clear
cut, I don't think you could do it.
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Q. What is a schizoid person with regard to
insanity or sanity? A. He has moments in which
his behavior is definitelyQ. Please, Doctor, is he a sane person or an
insane person? A. Well, he is both.
Q. Which was Fisher when he killed Miss Reardon? Was he a sane person or an insane person?
A. I imagine he had all the elements of an insane
person.
Q. What is your opinion, as a psychiatrist,
whether Fisher was a sane person or an insane person
when he killed Miss Reardon? A. I think, from the
best I can say, he was probably-definitely showed
signs of what I call impulsive or uncontrollable urge.
To that extent he might be considered as probably
a borderline between an uncontrollable urge, and,
at the same time, probably evidence of a psychosis.
Q. I am not speaking of what he was evidence of.
I am speaking of what he was subject to. Was he
an insane individual when he killed Miss Reardon
or was he a sane individual when he killed her, in
your opinion? A. Well, I don't think he was sane.
Q. Will you please answer the question, Doctor?
A.- Your question involves a yes and no because of
the way it is framed, but it doesn't give me any
latitude to answer on my part. You put them out
so that I can't say anything but what you want me to
say."
The same confinement of the psychiatric witness is evident in the testimony of Dr. Stowe in the case at bar.
Attempting to amplify the fact that knowledge of right and
wrong has no real relation to mental disease, he was interrupted by the prosecutor, who said:
"Your answer then is that you cannot form an
opinion as to whether the defendant knew that the
act was wrong?" (R. 12).
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Thus, it is clear that, as a norm of criminal responsibility, the right-wrong rules are totally inadequate. That
test has no real relation to the extent of impairment of the
mind, but at best refers to one of many possible symptoms
of mental disorder. The result of this is to punish the

afflicted, even though the affliction has brought on the
crime-in short, to punish for disease. No one has yet
satisfactorily replied to the penetrating observation of
Judge Ladd in State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 394 (1871):
"No argument is needed to show that to hold
that a man may be punished for what is the offspring
of disease would be to hold that he may be punished
for disease. Any rule which makes that possible
cannot be law."
B. The inadequacies of the right and wrong test as a
norm for criminal responsibility are not remedied by the

doctrine of irresistible impulse.
To compensate for the defects of the M'Naghten rules,
many courts (as did the District Court in the trial of this
case) have added thereto the doctrine of irresistible
impulse. First given expression in an 1834 Ohio case,
State v. Thompson, Wright's Ohio Rep. 617, 622, where
the jury was told that in addition to knowledge of right
and wrong, the defendant must have "had power to forbear or to do the act" to be held responsible, the charge of
"irresistible impulse" has usually been construed as adding to the cognitive knowledge required by the right-wrong
test, a requirement of unimpaired volition or "will".
However, an examination of the rationale and application of the irresistible impulse doctrine reveals that it
completely fails to obviate the inadequacies of the M'Naghten rules. The addition of the irresistible impulse doctrine
to the right-wrong test must, of necessity, be based on a
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realization that. the right-wrong test is not a valid formula
for the determination of criminal responsibility. Most of
the jurisdictions which have adopted the irresistible
impulse doctrine base this repudiation upon recognition
that the attempt in the M'Naghten case to diagnose the
mental state of an individual through the use of only one
of the many factors which make up human personality is
in direct conflict with scientific knowledge. In Parsons v.
State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 860 (1886), a case often termed
a "classic" exposition of the irresistible impulse doctrine,
the court concurred that mental disorder ".. . is never
established by any single diagnostic symptom, but by the
whole body of symptoms, no particular one of which is
present in every case." In Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492,
506-7 (1869), the court stressed:
"It [the M 'Naghten test] assumes either that
the mind possesses but one faculty, the cognitive, or
power to apprehend by the understanding; or that
this faculty alone is liable to disease which may
relieve the sufferer from responsibility. Neither
hypothesis is true."
Recognition of the basic defects of the M'Naghten rules
by these jurisdictions is laudable, but the attempt to remedy
those defects by the mere addition of the volitional aspect
through a charge of irresistible impulse is futile. In effect,
any court charging the M'Naghten rules and the doctrine
of irresistible impulse in conjunction is saying: "We know
that the mental condition of an individual depends on many,
many factors. Thus, we refuse to recognize that a single
factor, cognition, is determinative of that condition. So,
we will add one more of the many factors, volition, and
ignore the rest."I
The failure of the irresistible impulse test to consider
the extreme importance of the emotional, or affective, influ-
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ence on mental stability forms the basis for this criticism.
Dr. David Abrahamsen, one of the country's most distinguished psychiatrists, in his report to the Forty-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association in 1953, stated:
"There must be no doubt that emotional illness
may interfere with the action of the person to such
an extent that in many cases he cannot be considered
responsible for his actions."
Paradoxically, many of the courts which continue to
employ only the M'Naghten standard recognize the validity
of this criticism in rejecting the irresistible impulse theory.
In the English case of Rex v. True, 16 Crim. App. Rep. 164,
167 (1922), the court pointed out that men's minds are
not divided into separate compartments and, if a man's
will power was destroyed by a mental disturbance, it might
well be that the disease would so affect his mental powers
as to destroy his power of knowing his act was wrong.
The same foundation for rejecting the irresistible impulse
test is expressed in the leading American case of State v.
Harrison,36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892). One of the
most prolific pro-M'Naghten writers, Professor Hall, in
his recent article on M'Naghten in 42 American Bar Association Journal,917, 985 (1956), posits his entire argument
on similar grounds. The inconsistency in such a position
is inescapable. "We choose one factor, the cognitive,"
they say "to determine the mental status of an accused.
We strongly reject the addition of any other factors in
our decision, as that addition fails to recognize that the
personality of an individual is composed of a great many,
interdependent factors." It is obvious that any refutation
of irresistible impulse on these grounds would necessarily
represent adequate rebuttal of the right-wrong test.
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The basic defect in the irresistible impulse test is identical to that of the M'Naghten rules. The attempt of both
to crystallize current medical theories into legal tests of
responsibility has proved inadequate in all respects. Consequently, the case reports are replete with graphic
illustrations of the conviction, imprisonment, and execution
of people who are undeniably insane, yet completely outside the orbit of either test.
I A prime example of this is reflected in the case of
People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124 (1907). Frank
Willard, an alcoholic paranoid who was convinced that he
had been appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt and
the Governor of California to arrest evildoers, had twice
been committed by a judge of the Superior Court to the
State Hospital for the Insane, each time being discharged.
Soon after Willard's second release, the sheriff of thel
county, having heard that Willard was acting in a peculiar
manner, brought him to the courthouse where two physicians were summoned as medical examiners and reported
to the judge that Willard was insane and "homicidal and
dangerous." The judge declared Willard insane and
ordered him recommitted to the State Hospital for care
and treatment. While the judge was signing the order,
Willard started to leave the courtroom. When the sheriff
tried to intercept him, Willard drew a pistol and shot and
killed the sheriff. The Supreme Court of California, using
the MI'Naghten formula, upheld his conviction of first
degree murder. The circumstances negatived any question
of "irresistible impulse", and Willard, formally adjudged
insane only a few minutes before the act, was executed as
sane.
Other cases of persons with severe mental disorder
whose acts are obviously the product of that disorder, yet
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who still know right from wrong and are unaffected by
irresistible impulse, appear in the authorities. Obviously
made responsible by instructions such as those given by
the trial court would be the person afflicted by a depressive
condition accompanied by religious delusions urging him
to kill his children in order to spare them the theological
consequences of sin (Kinberg, ForensicPsychiatryWithout
Metaphysics, 40 J. Crim. Law and Criminology 555, 569
(1950)), and the lunatic who supposes himself to be commanded by God to perform his act, or who believes himself
to be God. McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S. W. 883
(1922). Undoubtedly made responsible would be the madman who commits the crime for the purpose of bringing
punishment upon himself, for by the nature of the case
he knows the act is punishable. Hadfield's Case, 27 How.
St. Tr. 1282 (1800).
C. The product of mental disease test remedies the
basic defects of the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse rules and
provides an effective norm of criminal responsibility.
The test embodied in the instruction requested by the
petitioner is the same as the one which was adopted by
the New Hampshire courts eighty-six years ago. State
v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870). It is also the same as the one
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the landmark decision of Durham v. United States,
214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954). The test "is simply that
an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
Durham v. United States, supra, p. 874. This test, usually
referred to as the Durham test, effectively implements
the policy of the law that the insane are to be exculpated
from responsibility.
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Of paramount importance is the fact that the Durham
test predicates non-responsibility on the nature of the
diseaseitself, and its effects on the defendant's act. It does
not, as do the right and wrong-irresistible impulse rules,
attempt to codify medical theories into law. Because it
does not, it avoids the imposition of punishment for disease.
The M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test assumes that it is
possible to describe insanity in terms of a few particular
symptoms, crystallize that description into a rule of law,
and by applying that rule achieve a just separation of the
responsible from the non-responsible. It is this assumption that the Durham rule rejects, holding that psychiatric
knowledge has conclusively established it to be false. As
Judge Bazelon pointed out in the Durham case, 214 F. 2d
862, 872 (D. C.Cir. 1954):
"The fundamental objection to the right-wrong
test, however, is not that criminal irresponsibility
is made to rest upon an inadequate, invalid or indeterminable symptom or manifestation, but that it is
made to rest on any particular symptom. In attempting to define insanity in terms of a symptom, the
courts have assumed an impossible role, not merely
one for which they have no special competence."
It is indeed an impossible task to attempt to crystallize
in a legal rule all the symptoms that characterize insanity.
Professor John Whitehorn of the Johns Hopkins Medical
School expressed, the medical view:
"The medical profession would be baffled if asked
to write into the legal code universally valid criteria
for the diagnosis of the many types of psychotic
illness which may seriously disturb a person's
responsibility, and even if this were attempted, the
diagnostic criteria would have to be rewritten from
time to time, with the progress of psychiatric knowl-
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edge." Quoted in Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 419-420 (1952).
Thus, any theory of responsibility which crystallizes
existing medical theories must necessarily become obsolete
with the passage of. time and the advance of knowledge.
There is but one way to avoid this defect-the criteria of
responsibility must be the clinical entity, disease, and not
what current knowledge considers evidence of it. Then, as
scientific progTess reveals more accurate means of determining the presence and nature of mental disease, the information may be effectively utilized. Such a test becomes self
adjusting.
The Durham test will also assist the expert witness in
his task of communicating to the jury the actual nature of
the disorder which afflicts the accused, because the disease
itself and its relation to defendant's acts become the criteria of his responsibility. Thus, as the court pointed out
in Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 875 (D. C. Cir.
1954):
"1... the jury is not required to depend on arbi-

trarily selected 'symptoms, phases, and manifestations' of the disease as criteria for determining the
ultimate questions of fact.... Testimony as to such
'symptoms, phases and manifestations,' along with
other relevant evidence, will go to the jury .... "
A substantial trend of recent authority supports the
principle of the test proposed by the petitioner. The English Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953,
after complete investigation of the subject, rejected both
the MI'Naghten rules and the irresistible impulse test and
focused the question of responsibility on the disease itself,
recommending that it be left to the jury "to determine
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whether at the time of the act the accused was suffering
from disease of the mind or mental deficiency to such a
degree that he ought not to be held responsible." Royal
Commission Report 275-6. The Committee on Psychiatry
and Law of the Group for the Advancement on Psychiatry
recommended, after extensive study, that criminal responsibility be precluded in cases where the accused was suffering from a committable mental disease, "and in consequence
thereof, he committed the act." Report No. 26 of Committee on Psychiatry and Law 7-8 (1954). In 1951 Chief Judge
Biggs, speaking for three dissenting judges of the Third
Circuit sitting en bave in United States ex rel. Smnith v.
Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 1951), concluded:
"We can see no reason why the legal test of irresponsibility for the commission of a crime should not
be based upon the principle that if the mental illness
of the accused is the proximate, or a contributory
cause of the crime, then the accused may not be found
guilty of murder."
These authorities, as well as the observations of "medico-legal writers in large number" prompted the monumental decision in Durhavm v. U. S., 214 F. 2d 862, 870 (D.
C. Cir. 1954), which has already had far-reaching effect
in giving new impetus to the reconsideration of the obsolete
tests. The Minnesota Supreme Court has very recently
adopted the "product of mental disease" test in determining whether an insane wife killer should be barred from
sharing in her property, even though the court was bound
to the right-wrong test by statute in criminal cases. Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N. W. 2d 450 (Minn. 1956). The court
squarely recognized the inadequacies of the M'Naghten
rules:
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"The fact that [defendant] committed the act
knowing it was wrong with full realization of its
consequences should not be considered in a vacuum
apart from the disease which produced the act. We
feel that the better rule to be applied to the case
before us is that the slayer will n6t be barred from
taking the property where his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease. In light of the presentday knowledge of the nature of mental diseases, it is
not realistic to apply the arbitrary right-and-wrong
test to the facts in this case."
POINT

I.

It was error to refuse to instruct the jury that the
petitioner's mental condition might be considered in
determining whether the homicide had been committed
with the premeditation and deliberation necessary to
constitute first degree murder.
A second defense of petitioner is that he did not commit murder in the first degree, since he was incapable of a
deliberate and premeditated killing as required by 35 Stat.
1143 (1909), 18 U. S. 0. see. 1111, providing:
"§1111 Murder
"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind
of willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated
killing... is murder in the first degree.
"Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
"(b) Whoever is guilty of murder in the first
degree, shall suffer death unless the jury qualifies
its verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punish-
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ment,' in which event he shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for life;
"Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for
life."
The District Court gave a charge on premeditation and
deliberation which made no reference to the petitioner's
mental condition, saying in substance that premeditation
is the "formation of a specific intent to kill"; that deliberation is "consideration and reflection upon the preconceived
design to kill" and involves "turning it over in the mind"
and "givn'g it second thought"; that while "the formation of the design to kill may be instantaneous," deliberation requires the lapse of an appreciable but no fixed time
between the formation of the design to kill and the fatal
act; and that the "fact of deliberation" governs rather
than "the length of time it may have continued" (R. 15).
As evidence had been introduced that "the defendant's
mental condition was such that he was incapable of premeditation or the formation of an intent to commit a crime"
(R. 14), the court was requested to give an instruction
based on the doctrine of partial responsibility-that the
jury might consider evidence of mental disorder of the
accused, even though short of total insanity, to determine
whether he was capable of premeditation and deliberation
so as to be guilty of murder in the first degree (R. 14-15).
The request was denied, and the refusal affirmed upon
appeal. The petitioner here contends that this request
represents the law, and that failure to give it in this case
prejudiced his substantial rights.
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A. To sustain a conviction for first degree murder premeditation and deliberation may not be implied but must
be established in fact.
The crimes of first and second degree murder are
separate and distinct, the difference lying in the mental
state requisite to each. To find Carl Young guilty of first
degree murder, it must be determined that he premeditated
and deliberated. Deliberation and premeditation are essential elements of the crime; if they are not established, the
crime is not shown.
These mental elements may not be implied but must be
established as facts. The rule was stated in "Sabens v,.
U. S., 40 App. D. C.440, 443 (D. C. Cir. 1913):
" ...a deliberate intent to take life is declared to
be an essential element of murder in the first degree,
and this of course must be shown as a fact. While
implied malice at common law was sufficient to make
an offense murder, under our statute which requires
proof of actual malice, implied malice constitutes
murder in the second degree."
Thus the requirement for first degree murder is that the
particular accused actually premeditated and deliberated.
B. Evidence that the accused was mentally disordered
is relevant in determining whether the accused in fact premeditated and deliberated.
Since it is actual premeditation and deliberation that is
required, evidence of mental disorder should be considered.
It is clear that one who could not premeditate and deliberate did not in fact do so. As the Indiana Court stated in
Asz)?an v, State, 123 Ind. 347, 352, 24 N. E. 123, 125 (1889):
"... it would be legal as Well as logical incongruity to hold that the crime of murder in the first
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degree could only be committed after deliberate
thought or premeditated malice, and yet that it might
be committed by one who was without mental capacity
to think deliberately or to determine rationally."
In the single case in which the defense of partial responsibility was urged upon this Court, no decision was rendered
on its merits. In Fisher v. United States, 328 U. S. 463
(1946), a case arising out of the District of Columbia,
refusal of the trial court to instruct according to the doctrine was assigned as error. This Court refused to overturn the decision of the lower court, but did not base its
refusal on the ground that the instruction was unsound.
Rather, it was held that acceptance or rejection of such a
defense was a matter of local concern with which the
Supreme Court could not rightfully interfere. The Court
stated, p. 476:
"We express no opinion upon whether the theory
for which petitioner contends should or should not
be made the law of the District of Columbia. Such
a radical departure from common law concepts is
more properly a subject for the exercise of legislative power or at least for the discretion of the
courts of the District. The administration of
criminal law in matters not affected by constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter
peculiarly of local concern." (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Military Appeals, accepting the principle
herein urged, observed that the Fisher case rested on local
law. U. S. v. Kunak,U. S. C. M. A. 346, 17 C. M. R. 346
(1954).
Incapacity, where it results from voluntary intoxication, is relevant for the jury to consider in its finding
whether a killing is deliberate and premediated. The leading case is Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 651 (1881). In revers-
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ing the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, which had
refused to instruct that intoxication should be considered
by the jury in determining the accused's mental state, this
Court stated, p. 634:
"But when a statute establishing different
degrees of murder requires deliberate premeditation
in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the
question of whether the accused is in such condition
of mind, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise, as
to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a material subject of consideration
by the jury." (Emphasis added.)
Properly analyzed, the Hopt case establishes the proposition that incapacity resulting from any cause is relevant
to whether deliberate premeditation existed. The broad
language used does not confine the rule to instances of
intoxication. What is stated is that deliberate premeditation may be negated by reason of "drunkenness or otherwise."
Nor can the reasoning of the case be limited to instances
of intoxication. The pivotal point in its rationale is that
the accused was incapacitated, not that he was intoxicated.
What is significani is the state of mind of the accused, not
the means whereby it was produced. Accordingly, the
principle extends to all situations, including mental disorder, whereby a defendant is incapable of entertaining
the required state of mind. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
citing the Hopt case, stated:
"The learned trial court erred in ruling that no
abnormal mental condition was material on the general issue of not guilty, other than that produced
and existing at the time of the alleged homicide by
the use of intoxicating liquor ... the important circumstance was the disordered intellect, and not the
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neanzs by which it was produced." (Emphasis
added). Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 135; 86
N. W. 596, 598 (1901).
It is proper that such a view be adopted. Should the
voluntary drunkard receive better treatment at the hands
of the law than the mentally disordered who have no control over their conditions? The dictates of conscience call
for an emphatic negative reply, such as was given by a
New Jersey judge:
"The law is not the creation of such barbarous
and insensible animal nature as to extend a more
lenient rule to the case of a drunkard, whose mental
facilities are disturbed by his own will and conduct,
than to the case of a poor demented creature afflicted
by the hand of God." Kalisch, J., concurring in
State v. Noel, 102 N. J. L. 659, 694; 133 Atl. 274,
285 (1926).
Moreover, partial responsibility comports with modern
psychiatric knowledge. There are many variations of mental states between the person of superb mental health and
the madman, which fact has been recognized by this Court.
In Fisherv. United States, 382 U. S. 463, 475 (1946), it was
said that "No one doubts that there are more classifications
of mentality than the sane and the insane." And Mr. Justice
Murphy, dissenting, p. 492, observed, "the existence . . .
of partial insanity, is a scientifically established fact" and
argued that "common sense and logic recoil" at a rule ignoring this.
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C. Implicit in the legislative division of murder into
degrees is a policy to apply the death penalty only to that
class of murderers likely to be influenced by its threat.
Rejection of partial responsibility is inconsistent with this
aim.

The degree device adopted by Congress to define crime
is actually a means for prescribing varying measures of
punishments for crimes having the same common denominators, but differing as to the absence or presence of aggravating circumstances. At common law all murders resulted in
capital punishment. The division of the crime into two
groups by Congress is an acknowledgment that not all
cases of murder should entail the capital penalty. In effect,
therefore, the creation of first degree murder is an extraction from the general category of murder of certain cases
to which it was thought proper to apply capital punishment.
The purpose of this extraction was stated in Bullock v.
United States, 122 F. 2d 213, 214 (D. C. Cir. 1941):
"Statutes which distinguish deliberate and premediated murder from other murder, reflect a belief
that one who meditates an intent to kill and then
deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more
culpable or less capable of reformation than one who
kills on sudden impulse; or that the prospect of the
death penalty is more likely to deter men from
deliberate than impulsive murder."
Thus, implicit in the employment of the degree device
is the belief that not all murders should be capitally
punished, and that the most severe of sanctions is to be
imposed only where it is likely to prevent homicide.
To disallow the instruction desired on mental disorder
here is inconsistent with this policy. By its very nature
capital punishment can only prevent homicide (1) by
deterring, and (2) by incapacitating, the established crimi-
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nal from further activities. The death penalty being the
inhumane sanction that it is, it is reasonable that it was
intended to be imposed only when both preventive means
are operative. But deterence will effectively prevent crime
only when it operates on the rational faculties of the
would-be criminal. A person is deterred by the threat of
punishment. The impact of the threat is that it gives the
would-be criminal a motive for not committing the crime
to weigh against the motives in its favor. If for some
reason the threat is not perceived, or if perceived, there
be no opportunity to properly evaluate it, it is utterly deficient as a deterrent, for the deterrent effect of capital punishment will be felt only by those who have the time and
capacity to think and reason, and who do think and reason.
Thus it would seem more logical to impute to Congress an
intent to effectively utilize the high deterrent effect of
capital punishment, than to hold that Congress desired to
impose so severe a sanction where its deterrent effect is
never realized.
A similar conclusion has been reached by the Law Revision Commission of New York after reviewing the homicide
laws of that state. In stating that capital punishment was
not intended to be inflicted where its deterrent effect was
neutralized, the Commission concluded that as regards premeditation and deliberation:
"...

in requiring the actual state of mind of the

offender and all the influences contributing to the
actual mental condition to be considered, the Court
of Appeals was merely giving effect to the logical
implications of a policy that was expressed in the
statutes. . .

."

Report of the Law Revision Com-

mission for 1937, page 574.
Likewise, Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Fisherv. United
States, 328 U. S. 483 (1946) said:
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"The crime of murder was divided into two
classes . . . in recognition of the fact that capital
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when
murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation. It is this consideration that has led most of
the states to divide common law murder into two
crimes, and Congress followed this legislation."
If, then, the class of individuals which the first degree
murder definition seeks to encompass are those who as a
result of reasoned selection choose homicide as the means
of achieving their end, whatever that may be, it is manifest
that evidence of mental disorder, which shows the absence
of reasoned selection of homicide, is relevant to the issue
of the degree of crime. If the accused's mental state was
such as not to perceive the threat of punishment and weigh
it so as to make a reasoned selection of homicide, he is not
guilty of the most severe type of murder. Such are the
logical implications of the .policy expressed in the statute.

D. The refusal of the requested instruction on partial
responsibility prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioner.

The error in not instructing the jury that mental disorder might be relevant to the degree of crime committed
was prejudicial. The rule is stated in Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U. S. 750, 765 (1946):
if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the
erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment
was not substantially swayed, it is impossible to conclude substantial rights were not affected."
...

Accordingly, it must appear affirmatively from the record
that the jury, in the absence of the instruction was not
confused between the use of evidence of mental disorder
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to excuse a crime, and its use to show that the specific
crime of first degree murder had not been committed.
Nothing of the sort appears here. The direction given
the jury was that only if the accused satisfied the requirements of the M 'Naghten rules or of the irresistible impulse
test could he be found not "guilty by reason of insanity"
or "not responsible." Guilty of what? Is it not likely that
the jury thought in terms of guilt of, and responsibility for,
first degree murder, the crime the accused was charged
with? Is it not likely that the charge on premeditation and
deliberation was considered a separate matter with which
the evidence of mental disorder was not concerned? There
must be an affirmative showing that the jury was not so disposed, and the record does not establish this.
In United States v. Kunak, 5 U. S. 0. M. A. 346, 17
C. M. R. 346, (1954) the court held the absence of an
instruction on partial responsibility prejudicial error stating that the "minimal requirements for the issue of premeditation" were not met. The same holding appears in
State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 (1915).
This Court has also recognized that an instruction on
partial responsibility may mean the difference between
life and death to the accused. In Fisher v. U. S., 328 U. S.
463, 470 (1946) it was observed that "...
the jury might
not have reached the result it did if the theory of partial
responsibility ... had been submitted" to the jury.
Accordingly, since it is impossible to tell what the verdict would have been had the case been left to the jury with
a proper instruction, the conviction cannot stand. Kwaku
v. Rex, (1946) A. C. 83.
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Conclusion.
The conviction should be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRIOx W. HFALmy,
JAMS M. KWAPP,
JERROLD L. STRASHEIM,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

